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LANE CHANGE: THE NEED TO CLARIFY MCHAFFIE AND 
ACCEPT A PUNITIVE DAMAGES EXCEPTION 
INTRODUCTION 
Traffic litigation, while not the most “noble”1 field of law, can constitute a 
large portion of a plaintiff’s attorney’s work and income.2 Simple automobile 
negligence claims, assuming the driver is solvent, provide quick settlements 
without the need for overly complex discovery.3 These cases become more 
attractive to plaintiff’s attorneys if the defendant driver was operating the 
vehicle in the course and scope of his or her employment—providing a link to 
an employer with deep pockets via the theory of respondeat superior.4 One of 
the more common vehicles in a traffic accident is a tractor-trailer, which is 
conveniently almost always operated by an employee acting in the course and 
scope of employment for a motor carrier company. Proceeding against the 
motor carrier company, however, becomes precarious in Missouri due to “the 
McHaffie rule.”5 
The McHaffie rule is simple: once a defendant motor carrier admits 
respondeat superior liability, the plaintiff is barred from proceeding on any 
additional theories of imputed liability against the employer, such as negligent 
 
 1. Traffic litigation attorneys are often negatively associated with aggressive and 
unscrupulous “ambulance chasers” in popular culture and even by state legislatures. Michigan has 
passed two house bills that would make it more difficult to obtain personal information about 
drivers in traffic accidents. H.R. 4770, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mi. 2013); H.R. 4771, 97th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Mi. 2013); see also Steven M. Gursten, Stopping ‘Ambulance-Chasing’ Lawyers Is an 
Issue that Everyone Should Support, MICH. AUTO LAW (Jul. 8, 2013), http://www.michiganauto 
law.com/news/lawyer-steven-gursten-editorial-stopping-ambulance-chasing-lawyers/ (praising 
the introduction of H.R. 4770 and H.R. 4771 and arguing for stronger reforms to protect accident 
victims and their families from excessive solicitation). 
 2. In 2005, automobile accidents represented fifty-two percent of all personal injury 
lawsuits. Staci A. Terry, Personal Injury Lawsuits in the U.S.: A Brief Look, LEGAL FIN. J. (Aug. 
26, 2011), http://legalfinancejournal.com/personal-injury-lawsuits-in-the-u-s-a-brief-look/. 
 3. Such a case represents a quick turnaround for plaintiff’s lawyers working on contingency 
agreements without draining too much of the attorney’s valuable time. Indeed, automobile 
litigation also carries a high success rate at trial, winning sixty-one percent of the time in 2005. 
Id. 
 4. An employer is liable for “the misconduct of an employee or agent acting within the 
course and scope of the employment or agency.” McHaffie ex rel. McHaffie v. Bunch (McHaffie 
II), 891 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Mo. 1995) (en banc). 
 5. See Wright v. Watkins & Shepard Trucking, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1220 (D. Nev. 
2013). 
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entrustment, hiring, supervision, or training.6 Motor carriers, relying on this 
favorable rule, typically answer a petition or complaint by admitting 
respondeat superior liability.7 The admission does not harm the motor carrier 
because a tractor-trailer driver almost always acts within the scope of his or her 
employment, simply due to the fact the commercial vehicle is on the road. 
Importantly, the admission brings the reward of eliminating all additional 
claims and limiting the scope of discovery only to the incident in question. 
If this were the end of the analysis, there would be little debate concerning 
the McHaffie rule. However, the Supreme Court of Missouri complicated the 
issue by discussing three potential exceptions to the rule.8 Notably, the court 
never answered whether any of the enumerated exceptions apply and flatly 
stated that the “issue[] await[s] another day.”9 One of the potential exceptions 
contemplated by the court occurs when the plaintiff alleges punitive damages 
against the motor carrier.10 And, while the court in McHaffie hinted it would 
return to clarify the issue,11 the existence of the punitive damages exception 
has remained unanswered by Missouri’s highest court for the past nineteen 
years. 
The lack of clarity on the punitive damages exception has left the Missouri 
state courts and the federal courts applying Missouri law in flux. Some courts 
denied the existence of any punitive damages exception while others accepted 
the exception but applied it in different ways.12 The Missouri Court of Appeals 
for the Western District recently provided clarity on the issue,13 but the 
Supreme Court of Missouri denied granting transfer.14 The decision leaves the 
punitive damages exception still in question and provides minimal clarity on 
proper application. 
This Comment discusses the McHaffie decision and the need for a punitive 
damages exception to its general rule. The Comment should provide helpful 
advice to plaintiff’s attorneys for proceeding against motor carriers. The first 
part of the Comment provides an overview of the facts and procedural history 
of the McHaffie case, the reasoning behind the McHaffie rule, and the Supreme 
 
 6. McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 826. 
 7. See King v. Taylor Express, Inc., No. 4:13cv1217 TCM, 2013 WL 5567721, at *1–2 
(E.D. Mo. Oct. 9, 2013) and Braxton v. DKMZ Trucking, Inc., No. 4:13-cv-1335-JCH, 2013 WL 
6592771, at *2–4 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 2013), for two recent examples of motor carriers answering 
the complaint with an admission of agency and a motion to dismiss all additional claims of 
imputed liability. 
 8. McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 826. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 13. Wilson v. Image Flooring, LLC, 400 S.W.3d 386, 393 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
 14. Id. at 386. 
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Court of Missouri’s discussion of the punitive damages exception. The second 
part of this Comment reviews the various interpretations given to the punitive 
damages exception and provides an overview of the most recent and relevant 
Missouri decision on the issue. 
The final part of the Comment discusses the need for the Supreme Court of 
Missouri to adopt the punitive damages exception and finally provide adequate 
guidance to the lower courts. This Comment proposes the adoption of the 
punitive damages exception and provides a framework to facilitate the ability 
of plaintiffs to discover evidence of a motor carrier’s dealings with its drivers 
in order to support claims of negligent entrustment, supervision, training, or 
hiring. Such an approach would even the imbalance created by the McHaffie 
rule and enable plaintiffs to go after the most egregious motor carriers who 
violate federal regulations in an extremely dangerous industry. 
I.  THE MCHAFFIE DECISION 
A. Background of the Case 
The facts of McHaffie, although hardly novel, presented the Missouri 
Supreme Court with an opportunity to decide basic legal principles about 
imputed liability. Plaintiff Laura McHaffie, a passenger in Cindy Bunch’s 
motor vehicle, was severely injured in a collision with a tractor-trailer driven 
by Donald Farmer.15 
The accident occurred at approximately 2:00 a.m. while Bunch and 
McHaffie drove eastbound on Interstate-44 in Greene County.16 The women 
were leaving the “Rocking K Bar” in Pittsburg, Kansas where they “danced, 
socialized, and drank beer.”17 At trial, McHaffie introduced evidence 
demonstrating that Bunch was intoxicated at the time of the accident, although 
Bunch was never successfully prosecuted for driving while intoxicated.18 
Bunch lost control of her vehicle and drove into oncoming traffic.19 While 
driving over the speed limit,20 Bunch’s vehicle fishtailed and “dipped” into the 
 
 15. McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 824. 
 16. McHaffie ex rel. McHaffie v. Bunch (McHaffie I), Nos. 18097, 18107, 18116, 18187, 
1994 WL 72430, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1994). 
 17. Id. 
 18. McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 830–31; The court affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit 
evidence of Bunch’s “recent consumption of beer” and alcoholic odor after the accident as it 
created an inference of impairment at the time of the collision. Id. at 831. Cindy Bunch was 
initially arrested for a DWI, but charges were not filed within thirty days of the arrest. Id. Ms. 
Bunch ultimately plead guilty to careless and imprudent driving for failing to maintain control of 
her vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration of “at least .05 and by driving off the main 
roadway and into the opposite lanes of traffic.” Id. 
 19. Id. at 824. 
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median area between the eastbound and westbound lanes of Interstate 44.21 
The loss of control caused Bunch to overcorrect and jerk her car back to the 
right side of the highway, where it eventually collided with the guardrail.22 
After hitting the guardrail, Bunch again overcorrected and pulled back to the 
median area, causing the car to complete a full spin while crossing over the 
median and into the westbound lane.23 The car then hit the opposite westbound 
guardrail and was subsequently struck by a tractor-trailer driven by Defendant 
Farmer.24 
The collision left McHaffie with permanent mental and physical 
disabilities.25 Rita McHaffie, the guardian and conservator of Laura 
McHaffie’s estate, brought suit against Bunch and Farmer to recover for 
Laura’s injuries.26 McHaffie also sued Bruce Transport and Leasing (“Bruce 
Transport”) and Rumble Transport, the employers of truck driver Farmer.27 
Bruce Transport was the owner-lessor of the tractor-trailer and Rumble 
Transport was the operator-lessee of the tractor-trailer.28 
B. Liability Under Respondeat Superior and Negligent Hiring or 
Entrustment? 
McHaffie claimed basic negligence against Defendant Bunch for failing to 
keep her vehicle on the correct half of Interstate 44.29 McHaffie similarly 
claimed Defendant Farmer was negligent for failing to keep a careful look out, 
failing to stop, swerve, or slacken speed, and failing to take evasive action 
before striking Defendant Bunch’s vehicle.30 McHaffie further alleged that 
Farmer was an employee of Defendants Bruce Transport and Rumble 
 
 20. Traffic reconstruction experts estimated that she was driving 75.55 miles per hour at the 
time of the accident. Id. at 832. An eyewitness, truck driver David Stiffler, testified that Bunch 
passed him with an estimated speed of seventy miles per hour. McHaffie I, 1994 WL 72430, at 
*2. 
 21. McHaffie I, 1994 WL 72430, at *2. 
 22. Id. The first loss of control would be important to McHaffie’s case as Defendant Farmer 
admitted he saw Bunch’s car initially cross the median and recognized the car “may come across, 
[sic] at least the potential that it would come across.” Id. This admission and evidence that Farmer 
could have stopped his tractor-trailer in time to avoid the eventual collision supported claims for 
failure to keep a careful look out, failure to stop, swerve, or slacken speed, and failure to take 
evasive action. Id. at *2–6. 
 23. Id. at *2. 
 24. Id. at *1–3. 
 25. McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 824. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. McHaffie ex rel. McHaffie v. Bunch (McHaffie I), Nos. 18097, 18107, 18116, 18187, 
1994 WL 72430, at *2–6 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1994). 
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Transport and was acting within the course and scope of his employment.31 
These claims were founded on the familiar agency theory of respondeat 
superior.32 In addition to the respondeat superior claim, McHaffie claimed that 
both Bruce Transport and Rumble Transport negligently hired, entrusted, and 
supervised Farmer.33 
In a pretrial order, the trial court held that both employer defendants, Bruce 
Transport and Rumble Transport, “judicially admitted” Farmer was “their 
agent and working within the scope and course of his employment at the time 
of the accident.”34 Based on its determination, the trial court made clear that 
“agency w[ould] not be an issue in this case.”35 At the same time, Rumble 
Transport submitted a motion to dismiss the pending independent negligent 
hiring, supervision, and entrustment claims.36 Strangely, the trial court never 
ruled on the motion and the case proceeded to trial with both respondeat 
superior and the independent negligent hiring, entrustment, and supervision 
claims submitted to the jury.37 Curiously, McHaffie only submitted the 
negligent hiring, entrustment, and supervision claims against Rumble 
Transport, but not Bruce Transport.38 
McHaffie presented evidence to the jury that Bunch negligently failed to 
keep her vehicle on the correct side of the road and drove into oncoming 
traffic.39 With regards to the crash itself, McHaffie submitted evidence 
demonstrating Farmer failed to keep a careful look out and failed to appreciate 
and apprehend the danger of Bunch’s oncoming car.40 In support of this theory, 
an expert testified that Farmer could have stopped in time to avoid the collision 
 
 31. McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 824. 
 32. Id. at 825. 
 33. Id. at 824. 
 34. McHaffie I, 1994 WL 72430, at *6. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. It is not clear from the Southern District’s appellate record if Rumble’s motion 
asserted a theory based on an insufficiency of evidence or on the legal argument that once the 
agency relationship was established that the negligent hiring claim must be dismissed. 
Presumably the motion was based on the sufficiency of the evidence since it was pending at the 
time the trial court entered the order taking judicial notice of the agency element. An argument 
based on the sufficiency of the evidence also comports with the fact that the trial court never ruled 
on Rumble’s motion to dismiss. If the motion to dismiss rested on the legal theory that respondeat 
superior liability and negligent hiring were mutually exclusive, then the trial court would have 
likely ruled on the merits of the issue right after taking judicial notice of the existence of agency. 
 37. Id. 
 38. McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 824. Not submitting against both employers is odd since 
Farmer is the admitted employer of both entities and therefore both had the duty to not entrust the 
tractor-trailer to an incompetent driver or hire an employee with a dangerous proclivity. Id. at 
824–26. 
 39. McHaffie I, 1994 WL 72430, at *1. 
 40. Id. at *4. 
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had he been “properly observant.”41 Obviously, since Bruce Transport and 
Rumble Transport admitted Farmer was an employee acting within the course 
and scope of his employment, all evidence proving Farmer’s negligence also 
proved the negligence of Bruce Transport and Rumble Transport.42 
The basic legal theory behind assigning liability to the employer based on 
the negligence of its employee is that the business enterprise can best absorb 
the loss as a “cost of doing business” via pricing or purchasing liability 
insurance.43 Indeed, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration requires 
motor carrier companies like Bruce Transport and Rumble to carry at least 
$300,000 in liability insurance due to the great potential for severe harm from 
tractor-trailer accidents.44 The legal theory considers employers as being best 
able to reduce the tortious conduct of individual employees by monitoring and 
structuring their enterprise.45 
To support the independent negligent hiring, supervision, and entrustment 
claims, McHaffie introduced evidence demonstrating Rumble Transport’s 
general failure to properly evaluate Farmer before hiring him and to ensure 
compliance with all relevant motor carrier regulations.46 First, McHaffie 
showed that Rumble Transport hired Farmer without requiring that he have 
adequate experience, testing, or training or that he undergo a required medical 
examination before driving their trucks.47 Rumble Transport also failed to 
enforce Department of Transport regulations and its own internal policies to 
ensure Farmer accurately maintained logbooks of all of his trips.48 Finally, at 
the time of the accident, Farmer had driven more hours than permitted by the 
Department of Transportation.49 
 
 41. McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 828. The expert’s opinion was based on accident 
reconstruction of the incident in question. Id. at 832. 
 42. Id. at 824–25. 
 43. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 500 
(5th ed. 1984). 
 44. 49 C.F.R. § 387.303 (2011). The insurance requirements increase as the potential for 
more disastrous consequences increases. For instance, motor carriers with trucks weighing more 
than 10,001 pounds and carrying hazardous substances, such as insecticides, must carry a 
minimum of $5,000,000 in liability insurance. See infra Part III.A and accompanying text 
(discussing inherent dangers in the motor carrier industry). 
 45. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 cmt. b (2006) (“Respondeat superior 
creates an incentive for principals to choose employees and structure work within the 
organization so as to reduce the incidence of tortious conduct. This incentive may reduce the 
incidence of tortious conduct more effectively than doctrines that impose liability solely on an 
individual tortfeasor.”). 
 46. McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 824. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 824, 827. 
 49. Id. at 828. It is unclear whether this was a violation of the continuous hourly limit, the 
total daily hourly limit, or the total weekly hourly limit. New Hours of Service Safety Regulations 
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The jury returned a verdict in favor of McHaffie, assessing 70% of the 
fault to Cindy Bunch for negligently driving into oncoming traffic.50 The jury 
assigned 10% of the liability to Farmer for failing to keep a careful lookout—
this liability was shared by his employers, Bruce Transport and Rumble 
Transport, via respondeat superior.51 Another 10% was assigned to Rumble 
Transport for negligently hiring Farmer.52 The final 10% was given to 
McHaffie herself for knowingly riding with an intoxicated driver.53 Damages 
were assessed to total $5,258,000.54 
C. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District 
Among other issues,55 all four defendants appealed the submission of the 
negligent hiring claim and the admission of evidence concerning Rumble 
Transport’s failure to comply with Department of Transportation regulations, 
to enforce logbook entries, and to properly evaluate Farmer’s experience 
before entrusting him with a truck.56 The Missouri Court of Appeals for the 
Southern District (“Southern District”) agreed with the defendants’ argument 
that a claim of negligent hiring or entrustment could not be submitted after the 
employer admits agency to a claim of respondeat superior.57 
The Southern District, noting the first impression nature of the issue, 
looked to basic principles of respondeat superior, to other jurisdictions 
addressing the issue, and to the potential for prejudice in holding that the 
negligent hiring claim was improperly submitted.58 The court cited to a 
majority view, which would later be known as “the McHaffie rule”: 
 
to Reduce Truck Driver Fatigue Begin Today, FED. MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN. (July 1, 
2013), http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/newsroom/new-hours-service-safety-regulations-reduce-truck-
driver-fatigue-begin-today. 
 50. McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 825. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. This case appears to be the poster child for tort reform advocates, as McHaffie 
obtained a seven-figure verdict after knowingly riding with a drunk driver and recovered from a 
truck driver and his employers, for failing to avoid a car speeding into oncoming traffic. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Farmer, Bruce Transport, and Rumble Transport also argued there was insufficient 
evidence to support the claim that Farmer failed to keep a careful look out and failed to avoid the 
collision. McHaffie ex rel. McHaffie v. Bunch (McHaffie I), Nos. 18097, 18107, 18116, 18187, 
1994 WL 72430, at *3–6 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1994). The Southern District disagreed and 
affirmed the decision of the trial court to submit both issues to the jury. Id. at *4–6. The Supreme 
Court of Missouri would similarly hold that sufficient evidence existed to submit a claim of 
negligence against Farmer. McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 825. 
 56. McHaffie I, 1994 WL 72430, at *6–7. 
 57. Id. at *12. 
 58. Id. at *8–12. 
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[I]f the [employer] has already admitted liability under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, it is improper to also allow a plaintiff to proceed against 
the [employer] of a vehicle on the independent negligence theories of negligent 
entrustment and negligent hiring or training.59 
The Southern District agreed with the majority view for two basic reasons: 
prejudice to the employer and the unnecessary nature of the additional direct 
negligence claims against the employer.60 The prejudice occurs by allowing 
evidence of prior acts of negligence to prove negligent hiring, when such 
evidence would otherwise be inadmissible to prove negligence at the time of 
the accident.61 Establishing negligent hiring or supervision is also unnecessary 
as the issue of attaching liability to an employer for the acts of the employee is 
uncontested once the employer admits respondeat superior liability.62 
Admitting evidence of prior bad acts to prove a claim of negligent hiring or 
supervision diverts the jury’s attention from the only contested issue—the 
negligence of the driver at the time of the accident.63 The Southern District 
reasoned that a prejudicial effect clearly occurred in the case as Rumble 
Transport was assigned ten percent of the liability for negligent hiring, even 
though “the pleadings and evidence revealed no additional liability upon 
Rumble based upon negligent hiring principles.”64 
D. The Supreme Court of Missouri 
The Supreme Court of Missouri granted transfer to decide whether 
McHaffie could submit a theory of liability against Rumble Transport for the 
negligent acts of Farmer and the negligent hiring or supervision of Farmer after 
Rumble Transport conceded he was acting in the course and scope of his 
employment.65 The court ultimately held that the negligent hiring instruction 
should not have been submitted to the jury and the evidence concerning 
Farmer’s lack of testing and inexperience, failure to maintain logbooks, and 
 
 59. Id. at *9 (quoting Wise v. Fiberglass Systems, Inc., 718 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Idaho 1986)). 
 60. Id. at *10, *12. 
 61. McHaffie I, 1994 WL 72430, at *9. 
 62. Id. at *12. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. McHaffie ex rel. McHaffie v. Bunch (McHaffie II), 891 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Mo. 1995) (en 
banc). Also considered were the issues of whether sufficient evidence existed to submit a 
negligence claim against Farmer for failing to keep a careful outlook and avoid the collision, 
whether a juror’s nondisclosure during voir dire colored her ability to fairly hear the case, 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining the prejudicial effect of the juror’s 
nondisclosure without an evidentiary hearing, whether evidence of Bunch’s intoxication was 
admissible, whether the police report was admissible, and whether a comparative fault instruction 
against McHaffie was proper for negligently riding in a vehicle with an intoxicated driver. Id. at 
828–32. 
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Rumble Transport’s failure to enforce regulations were inadmissible for being 
irrelevant and prejudicial.66 Despite comprehensively reviewing all of Rumble 
Transport’s motor carrier violations,67 the court never considered whether it 
should be exposed to liability beyond that of Farmer. 
The case was remanded for a retrial with instructions that the 20% total 
assessment of fault against Farmer, Bruce Transport, and Rumble Transport be 
set aside.68 Notably, the court rejected the defendants’ argument that the 
prejudicial evidence affected the size of the verdict. The court instructed the 
retrial court to only instruct the jury to allocate 20% of the total damages, 
$1,051,600, to McHaffie, Bunch, Farmer, Rumble Transport, or Bruce 
Transport.69 At the retrial, the jury apportioned 5% of the disputed amount of 
fault to Bunch (totaling her fault at 75%) and the remaining 15% back to 
Farmer, Bruce Transport, and Rumble Transport.70 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri, defendants Farmer, Bunch, 
and Rumble Transport71 asserted two positions, one narrow and one much 
more broad: (1) the negligent hiring claim was inappropriate because Rumble 
Transport admitted that Farmer was acting within the course and scope of his 
employment at the time of the collision and any recovery was dependent on 
Farmer’s negligence and (2) that respondeat superior and negligent hiring or 
entrustment theories of recovery were by definition inconsistent and could not 
both be submitted to a jury.72 
The court began its analysis with an overview of the three theories of 
imputed liability alleged by McHaffie against Bruce Transport and Rumble 
Transport to hold them responsible for the conduct of Farmer: (1) respondeat 
superior, (2) negligent entrustment,73 and (3) negligent hiring.74 
 
 66. Id. at 824–27. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 827–28. 
 69. Id. at 828. 
 70. McHaffie ex rel. Wieland v. Bunch, 951 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). From the 
original jury verdict on March 3, 1992 to the final disposition on April 2, 1998, which included 
the first appeal to the Southern District Court of Appeals, the appeal to the Missouri Supreme 
Court, the retrial, and the second appeal to the Southern District Court of Appeals disputing 
prejudgment interest, the amount owed to McHaffie only decreased $22,000. 
 71. McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 825. Presumably, Defendant Bruce Transport took no issue 
with the instruction since the negligent hiring claim was only made against Rumble Transport and 
resulted in ten percent of the liability going exclusively to Rumble Transport. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Negligent entrustment requires the plaintiff prove “that (1) the entrustee is incompetent, 
(2) the entrustor knew or had reason to know of the incompetence, (3) there was an entrustment 
of a chattel, and (4) the negligence of the entrustor concurred with the negligence of the entrustee 
to harm the plaintiff.” Id. (citing Evans v. Allen Auto Rental and Truck Leasing, Inc., 555 S.W.2d 
325, 326 (Mo. 1977) (en banc)). 
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The court briefly recited the rule for respondeat superior and recognized 
that the element of agency was uncontested by both Bruce Transport and 
Rumble Transport.75 The court next reviewed the negligent entrustment claim 
against Rumble Transport and noted the verdict director failed to instruct on 
one of the required elements, namely “that Farmer was incompetent or 
unqualified to drive commercial vehicles.”76 
In its review of negligent hiring, the third and final theory of imputed 
liability, the court stated that Missouri case law requires intentional misconduct 
or criminal behavior on behalf of the employee or the existence of a “special 
relationship” between the employer and the injured party to prove negligent 
hiring.77 The court expressed doubts as to whether McHaffie had pled or 
submitted any facts to satisfy this element of negligent hiring and reasoned that 
the pleadings, evidence, and jury instructions all seemed to “more closely 
track” with negligent entrustment.78 Despite pointing out evidentiary, pleading, 
and jury instruction issues with the negligent entrustment and negligent hiring 
claims, the court assumed the facts to be sufficient for a negligent hiring cause 
of action.79 
After determining that a claim for respondeat superior and negligent hiring 
existed, the court addressed whether both could be submitted to a jury. The 
court began by describing the “majority view” adopted by the Southern District 
and deemed it “the better reasoned view.”80 The court gave three primary 
reasons for dismissing additional claims of imputed liability after an employer 
admits an agency relationship for the purposes of respondeat superior.81 First, 
 
 74. Proof of negligent hiring does not require the negligent conduct occur within the course 
and scope of the employee’s employment. Id. The Court in McHaffie notes that the negligent 
hiring cause of action is not clearly drawn out by Missouri case law and seems to turn on the 
presence of a situation where “the employer knew or should have known of a particular 
dangerous proclivity of an employee followed by employee misconduct consistent with such 
dangerous proclivity by the employee.” Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 825. 
 77. Id. at 826. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. The court cited to the decisions from six other states (Arkansas, California, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, and Maryland) as well as American Jurisprudence and American Law Reports: 
Elrod v. G & R Construction Co., 628 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Ark. 1982); Armenta v. Churchill, 267 P.2d 
303, 308–09 (Cal. 1954); Clooney v. Geeting, 352 So. 2d 1216, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); 
Willis v. Hill, 159 S.E.2d 145, 157 (Ga. 1967); Wise v. Fiberglass Systems, Inc., 718 P.2d 1178, 
1181 (Idaho 1986); Houlihan v. McCall, 78 A.2d 661, 664–65 (Md. 1951); 7A AM. JUR. 2D 
Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 643 (1980); Debra E. Wax, Annotation, Propriety of 
Allowing Person Injured in Motor Vehicle Accident to Proceed Against Vehicle Owner Under 
Theory of Negligent Entrustment Where Owner Admits Liability Under Another Theory of 
Recovery, 30 A.L.R. 4th 838 (1984). Id. 
 81. McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 826. 
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the court reasoned that if a plaintiff were allowed to proceed on all possible 
theories82 to impute liability after the imputation was freely admitted, the 
additional evidence for each additional theory “serves no real purpose.”83 This 
lack of purpose results in a waste of resources for both courts and litigants by 
requiring the “laborious[]” admission of evidence on an uncontested issue.84 
Second, the additional evidence would be potentially inflammatory in addition 
to being unnecessary.85 The first two reasons echoed the primary holding of the 
Southern District, although the Supreme Court focused more on the 
unnecessary nature of the additional claims, rather than the potential for 
prejudice.86 
In its final reason for barring additional imputed negligence claims, the 
court noted the fundamental problem of allocating damages in a comparative 
fault system after vicarious liability has been admitted.87 Because respondeat 
superior holds the employer strictly liable for the conduct of its employee, the 
fault of the employee and the employer should be equal.88 In the court’s words, 
“[t]he liability of the employer is fixed by the amount of liability of the 
employee.”89 By adding negligent hiring or negligent entrustment on top of the 
respondeat superior claim, the employer may be attributed more fault than the 
employee.90 Indeed, this is exactly what happened at the first trial where 
Rumble Transport was assigned 20% of the fault, while only 10% of the fault 
was assigned to its employee.91 The court recognized this unfair allocation 
whereby an employer may be imputed more liability than that of its agent.92 
So, while negligent hiring remains a legitimate cause of action in the state of 
 
 82. The court discussed negligent entrustment of a chattel to an incompetent, conspiracy, the 
family purpose doctrine, joint enterprise, and ownership liability statutes as other potential legal 
theories to impute liability to an employer. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Indeed, the court rejected the notion that the evidence of prior bad acts prejudiced the 
verdict amount and was only limited to prejudicing the ability of the jury’s “assessment of 
liability as to Farmer, Rumble and Bruce.” McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 827. 
 87. Id. at 826. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 827. 
 91. Ten percent of Bruce Transport’s liability was based on the imputed negligence of 
Farmer and ten percent was due to negligently hiring Farmer. McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 825. 
The court was only concerned with an improper allocation of damages and dismissed the idea that 
the prejudicial evidence regarding negligent entrustment somehow impaired the jury’s ability to 
follow the damages instruction or made some discernible difference with how damages would be 
assessed. Id. at 827. 
 92. Id. 
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Missouri, any evidence proving such a claim becomes completely unnecessary 
if agency is admitted due to the strict liability nature of respondeat superior.93 
McHaffie relied on case law from the minority of jurisdictions and Prosser 
and Keeton on the Law of Torts to justify dual submission of claims, even 
when agency was admitted.94 The court gave little consideration to the 
reasoning from the minority approach due to the undesirable result of an 
employer being given more percentage of the fault than created by the 
employee.95 The court derisively commented on the minority approach, stating 
the minority’s reasoning was “plainly illogical” and it was “little wonder that 
these cases are and properly should remain cited as contrary to ‘the 
overwhelming weight of authority.’”96 
McHaffie relied on Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts to assert the 
proposition that an employer/master may be subjected to vicarious liability for 
the torts of his servant, as well as being liable for his own negligence for 
“selecting or dealing with the servant.”97 The court rejected Prosser as 
persuasive authority, noting it only restated the general rule regarding 
“multiple theories” of imputing liability, but without commenting on the 
submission of dual theories.98 The court reasoned the general statement of law 
failed to support any argument that multiple theories of imputed liability could 
be submitted simultaneously and thus permit the jury to make a “separate 
assessment of fault” to an employer beyond the acts of his employee.99 Indeed, 
Prosser states that when an employer’s liability is entirely derivative from an 
employee’s negligence, both should share the liability equally, with no 
apportionment of fault between the two.100 
 
 93. Id. at 826–27. 
 94. Id. at 827. McHaffie cited Perin v. Peuler, 130 N.W.2d 4 (Mich. 1964), Clark v. Stewart, 
185 N.E. 71 (Ohio 1933), and Bruck v. Jim Walter Corp., 470 So. 2d 1141 (Ala. 1985). Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 827 (quoting Willis v. Hill, 159 S.E.2d 145, 157 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1967)). 
 97. Id. McHaffie specifically cited to PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 43, § 70, at 501–02. 
(“Once it is determined that the man at work is a servant, the master becomes subject to vicarious 
liability for his torts. He may, of course, be liable on the basis of any negligence of his own in 
selecting or dealing with the servant, or for the latter’s acts which he has authorized or ratified, 
upon familiar principles of negligence and agency law.”). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Glidewell v. S.C. Mgmt., Inc., 923 S.W.2d 940, 946–47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) 
(quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 43, § 52, at 346 for the rule: “The liability of a master for the 
acts of a servant . . . within the scope of the employment . . . stands upon grounds that do not 
support apportionment. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the master becomes 
responsible for the same act for which the servant is liable, and for the same consequences. 
Ordinarily there is a sound basis for indemnity, but not for any apportionment of damages 
between the two.”). 
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The ultimate holding of the Supreme Court of Missouri, and the new 
“McHaffie rule,” was that once an employer admits agency in a respondeat 
superior claim, there could not be a submission of an independent imputed 
liability claim against the employer.101 
1. Exceptions to the Rule 
After rejecting the dual submission of claims, the court discussed possible 
exceptions to the McHaffie rule.102 It is not clear why the court decided to 
tackle purely hypothetical exceptions, especially after noting, “none of those 
circumstances exist here.”103 Perhaps the exceptions came up because at least 
one of the jurisdictions cited recognized a punitive damages exception104 or 
because the Southern District posited a hypothetical whereby an employee 
could be non-negligent, but an employer could.105 It is also possible that the 
dicta tried to clarify that respondeat superior and negligent hiring were not per 
se mutually exclusive, as argued by defendants. 
For whatever reason, the court put forth three potential exceptions in which 
the additional claims of liability against the employer would be properly 
submitted to the jury.106 First, the court considered a situation where the theory 
of liability did not depend on the negligence of the employee.107 Other than 
this generalized statement, the court did not offer much insight as to what fact 
patterns might satisfy this potential exception or a citation to any case 
precedent providing an example.108 Next, the court considered a situation 
where the employer, but not the employee, would be liable for punitive 
 
 101. McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 826–27. 
 102. Id. at 826. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Clooney v. Geeting, 352 So. 2d 1216, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (noting that 
had allegations proved sufficient, the jury would have considered a claim for punitive damages). 
 105. See McHaffie ex rel. McHaffie v. Bunch (McHaffie I), Nos. 18097, 18107, 18116, 
18187, 1994 WL 72430, at *8 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1994). The Southern District posited a 
hypothetical in which Farmer caused the accident due to a medical condition of which Rumble 
Transport was aware, or should have been aware, when Farmer was hired. The Southern District 
reasoned that under these circumstances Farmer would not be negligent if the complication was 
unforeseeable to him at the time of the accident, but Rumble Transport would be negligent in 
hiring a truck driver with a medical condition capable of impairing his ability to drive. The court 
correctly pointed out that these limited set of facts would permit the submission of both claims as 
they were not “separate and apart.” In other words, the same evidence could prove one claim 
while not proving the other, making evidence of negligence at the time of the accident and 
negligent business practices independently relevant—even if agency was admitted by Rumble 
Transport. Id. 
 106. McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 826. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. See supra note 105 for a potential fact pattern satisfying this exception. 
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damages.109 Finally, the court considered an exception for when there is 
relative fault between the employer and the employee.110 After scratching the 
surface of these potential exceptions, the court noted that no facts in the case 
supported any potential exception and that deciding if there was any exception 
to the general rule of McHaffie “await[s] another day.”111 
2. Punitive Damages Exception 
The potential punitive damages exception would serve to be the most 
influential and effective method for plaintiffs to get around the McHaffie rule. 
The basis for the punitive damages exception, and the court’s cited precedent, 
comes from Clooney v. Geeting, a decision from the Florida Court of 
Appeals.112 In Clooney, much like in McHaffie, the plaintiff was struck by a 
tractor-trailer and asserted claims of negligence against the driver and his 
employer, as well as negligent hiring, employment, and entrustment claims 
only against the employer.113 Again, the element of agency for respondeat 
superior was uncontested by the employer.114 
The only distinction between Clooney and McHaffie was that the plaintiff 
in Clooney asserted a claim for punitive damages against the employer on the 
basis that it knew the employee/driver was “neither physically nor mentally 
able to properly drive the truck, and that its safety manager had pointed this out 
prior to the accident.”115 Despite this evidence, the Florida appellate court 
upheld the trial court’s decision to not submit on the issue of punitive damages 
because the evidence was insufficient to amount to malice or wanton, willful, 
or outrageous conduct.116 
The Florida court recognized, however, that if a plaintiff could allege facts 
sufficient to state a claim for punitive damages, then verdict instructions for 
negligent hiring, employment, or entrustment would be submissible to the 
jury.117 The court remanded the case for a new trial with the instructions that if 
the plaintiff could amend the pleadings with sufficient ultimate facts for 
punitive damages, then the negligent hiring, employment, and entrustment 
claims would be submissible.118 Notably, the court in Clooney decided the 
 
 109. McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 826. The court cited to Clooney, 352 So. 2d at 1220 in 
support of the punitive damages exception. No other sources were cited for the other two 
potential exceptions. 
 110. McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 826. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Clooney, 353 So. 2d at 1218, 1220. 
 114. Id. at 1220. 
 115. Id. at 1219. 
 116. Id. at 1219–20. 
 117. Id. at 1220. 
 118. Clooney, 353 So. 2d at 1220. 
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issue on the sufficiency of the evidence for punitive damages and made an 
explicit exception to the general rule of barring additional claims of imputed 
liability when agency has been conceded. 
The court in Clooney affirmatively created a punitive damages exception 
to the general rule, even though the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts for 
punitive damages. While the Supreme Court of Missouri looked to Clooney as 
a source for the exception in McHaffie, the court hesitated on whether the 
exception existed under Missouri law as it did under Florida law. The 
hesitation created an uncertainty in Missouri law and a missed opportunity to 
permit McHaffie to amend her pleadings to include a claim for punitive 
damages. 
II.  POST-MCHAFFIE PROBLEMS 
A. Legacy of the McHaffie Rule 
The court in McHaffie offered a possible punitive damages exception, but 
failed to state if it existed or how it would be applied. The lack of clarity 
creates problems for plaintiff’s attorneys that typically assert a claim for 
punitive damages in all pleadings. The court also failed to indicate when the 
additional claims of negligence against the employer should be dismissed once 
agency is admitted.119 This issue is particularly relevant when a motor carrier 
tries to limit discovery only to the incident in question to avoid revealing 
evidence capable of supporting a claim for punitive damages. 
The missed opportunity for clarification is particularly glaring considering 
Plaintiff McHaffie probably had enough evidence to submit a claim for 
punitive damages. Most significantly, evidence of Rumble Transport’s 
disregard of regulation and failure to oversee Farmer would typically warrant a 
jury instruction on punitive damages.120 Indeed, Missouri law generally holds 
that evidence of such industry violations is sufficient for punitive damages.121 
 
 119. See infra Part III.B for further discussion concerning the debate of when the McHaffie 
rule applies and whether this should have any effect on the limits of discovery. 
 120. See infra Part III.A.2 for a more in-depth discussion of why this set of facts warrants 
punitive damages. 
 121. Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 160 (Mo. 2000) (en banc) 
(holding a “knowing[] violat[ion] [of] a statute, regulation, or clear industry standard designed to 
prevent the type of injury that occurred” is a key factor in determining whether to submit a claim 
for punitive damages to the jury); Garrett v. Albright, Nos. 06-CV-4137-NKL, 06-CV-0785, 06-
CV-4139, 06-CV-4209, 06-CV-4237, 2008 WL 795613, at *2, *6 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 21, 2008) 
(holding the plaintiff had sufficient evidence to submit a claim for punitive damages based on 
violations of Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations regarding a driver’s medical history and 
maximum amount of hours that a driver is permitted to drive); Coon v. Am. Compressed Steel, 
Inc., 207 S.W.3d 629, 638–39 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (holding permissible an award for punitive 
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Ultimately, the court seemed willing to recognize a punitive damages 
exception by going out of its way to put forth the idea in dicta but failed to 
connect the dots when providing instructions for retrial.122 
B. How to Interpret McHaffie 
1. A Problem of Opportunity 
Recent decisions from Missouri state courts and federal courts applying 
Missouri law tend to find the dicta in McHaffie persuasive and hold that a 
punitive damages exception to the general rule exists.123 Despite a recent trend 
towards acceptance, it is difficult to gauge the full effect of the McHaffie rule, 
as its application almost necessarily occurs at the trial level, usually in the form 
of a motion to dismiss or a motion to strike, and will rarely make it to appeal. 
The typical procedure will be for a defendant employer to admit its 
employee was within the scope of his or her employment and motion to 
dismiss any additional claims of imputed negligence in reliance on the 
McHaffie rule.124 The motor carrier may also motion to strike the claim for 
punitive damages, knowing that even if the court agrees the exception exists, it 
cannot be invoked without evidence of a valid claim for punitive damages.125 
The McHaffie rule will often carry the day unless the trial court concludes a 
punitive damages exception exists and the plaintiff pled sufficient facts for 
punitive damages. An early victory for the plaintiff at the pleading stage will 
likely not mean much, as the plaintiff still has to justify submitting an 
additional claim of imputed liability for punitive damages against the 
employer. Given the recent trend in Missouri law, the plaintiff is more likely to 
lose by a dismissal of the punitive damages claim for failure to state a claim 
rather than a denial of the punitive damages exception.126 
 
damages because the motor carrier exhibited a conscious disregard for public safety by failing to 
comply with federal and state motor carrier regulations and industry standards). 
 122. The retrial would have to be bifurcated with the respondeat superior claim decided at the 
first stage and the issue of negligent entrustment or hiring and punitive damages decided at the 
second stage. See infra III.C and accompanying text on the best way to permit such a claim and 
evidence of motor carrier violations without creating unfair prejudice against defendant motor 
carriers. 
 123. See infra Part III.B.3 for a more in-depth discussion concerning the recent decision in 
Wilson v. Image Flooring, LLC, 400 S.W.3d 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
 124. See King v. Taylor Express, Inc., No. 4:13cv1217 TCM, 2013 WL 5567721, at *1–2 
(E.D. Mo. Oct. 9, 2013) (admitting vicarious liability for the negligent acts of its employee in its 
answer, defendant motor carrier company moved to strike claims for punitive damages and to 
dismiss direct claims of negligent hiring and entrustment). 
 125. Id. at *1 & n.3. 
 126. Braxton v. DKMZ Trucking, Inc., No. 4:13-cv-1335-JCH, 2013 WL 6592771, at *1, *3–
4 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 2013) (dismissing additional claims of imputed negligence against motor 
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More importantly, the plaintiff will likely doubt that sufficient evidence 
exists to support submitting a claim for punitive damages. A plaintiff’s 
attorney will have little more than a police report to draft the petition or 
complaint, and will almost certainly have no idea as to whether the motor 
carrier was in violation of federal regulations to support a claim for punitive 
damages before discovery begins.127 Since the plaintiff cannot know if there is 
sufficient evidence to support a claim for punitive damages, there is not much 
incentive or a procedural basis for appealing a granted motion to dismiss the 
additional imputed liability claims.128 
Given the hurdles for plaintiffs, any question of the punitive damages 
exception will most likely only be appealed where the plaintiff was able to 
submit a respondeat superior claim and an additional claim of imputed liability 
seeking punitive damages against the employer.129 The best way to do this 
would be by alleging the employer violated federal motor carrier 
regulations.130 But, because it is rare for a claim of punitive damages to be 
submitted to the jury and the application of the McHaffie rule typically occurs 
at the pleading stage, the punitive damages exception is rarely presented to the 
Missouri Court of Appeals.131 Due to a general lack of opportunity, the 
Missouri appellate courts have struggled to clarify the extent of the 
exception.132 And, due to the lack of guidance by the McHaffie decision itself, 
 
carrier after applying Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly “plausible” standard and finding the plaintiff 
“[did] not even attempt a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’”). 
 127. See infra Part III.A and accompanying text for a discussion concerning the best way to 
invoke the punitive damages exception with the petition. 
 128. Because the McHaffie rule works so well for defendant employers, but does not end the 
litigation altogether, plaintiffs can only file for an interlocutory appeal and will be rarely 
incentivized to do so. See MO. SUP. CT. R. 74.01 (explaining the Missouri standard to file an 
interlocutory appeal); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 (2012) (explaining the federal standard to 
file an interlocutory appeal). 
 129. Only two Missouri Court of Appeals cases have addressed whether any exception to 
McHaffie exists, with only one addressing the punitive damages exception. See Wilson v. Image 
Flooring, LLC, 400 S.W.3d 386, 392–93 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (finding an exception for punitive 
damages when the plaintiff claims direct liability by the employer and not merely vicarious 
liability via the employee’s negligence). 
 130. See infra Part III.A and accompanying text. 
 131. For instance, only one Missouri Appellate Court has addressed the dicta set forth in 
McHaffie. Wilson, 400 S.W.3d at 392–93 (finding the dicta persuasive and reasoning that the 
Supreme Court would find a punitive damages exception if faced with a similar issue today). 
 132. Besides Wilson, only Coomer has addressed the dicta in McHaffie and the potential for 
any exception to the general rule. Coomer v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., Nos. WD 
73984, WD 74040, 2013 WL 150838, at *5 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2013). In Coomer, the plaintiff 
asserted additional negligent hiring claims after an employer admitted respondeat superior on the 
basis that its theory of negligence was not derivative “‘from and . . . not dependent on the 
negligence of an entrustee or employee.’” Id. (quoting McHaffie ex rel.McHaffie (McHaffie II) v. 
Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822, 824) (Mo. 1995) (en banc)). The court did address whether any such 
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trial courts differ on whether the punitive damages exception exists and when 
the McHaffie rule applies.133 
Given the early dismissal of additional theories of imputed negligence and 
the general lack of reporting Missouri trial court decisions, it is difficult to 
fully appreciate how many negligent hiring or entrustment claims get barred at 
the very outset of litigation. A lack of reporting from the trial level is much 
less of a problem in the federal realm with the advent of PACER.gov and the 
publishing of unreported district court orders.134 As such, one of the best 
gauges for the application of the McHaffie rule and its possible punitive 
damages exception come from the United States District Courts for the Eastern 
and Western Districts of Missouri sitting in diversity and applying Missouri 
law. 
2. Federal Courts’ Application of McHaffie 
In many instances, the application of the McHaffie rule at the district court 
level is fairly straightforward: If the defendant admits vicarious liability under 
the respondeat superior claim and the plaintiff has not asserted a claim for 
punitive damages, then the additional claims of imputed liability are 
dismissed.135 In cases without a claim for punitive damages, there is relatively 
 
exception existed after concluding that the facts of the case were “indistinguishable from those 
rejected in McHaffie” and nothing in the evidence indicated that the employer’s lack of care 
might have caused the injuries absent any negligence by the employee. Id. 
 133. Compare Young v. Dunlap, 223 F.R.D. 520, 522 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (reasoning that 
allowing a plaintiff to argue negligent entrustment after the employer admitted imputed liability is 
“both redundant and prejudicial”), with Sargent v. Justin Time Transp., LLC, No. 4:09cv596 
HEA, 2009 WL 4559222, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 30, 2009) (reasoning that striking a negligent 
entrustment claim immediately after the employer admits imputed liability and before discovery 
would be “premature”). 
 134. PACER is the Public Access to Court Electronic Resources government website that 
serves as the filing hub for all federal court matters. PACER, https://www.pacer.gov (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2014). 
 135. See Young, 223 F.R.D. at 521–22 (granting employer defendant’s motion to dismiss 
negligent entrustment after the defendant admitted to imputed liability for the negligence of its 
employee, if any, under a respondeat superior claim). The court in Young found the case 
indistinguishable from McHaffie and held that allowing the plaintiff to argue negligent 
entrustment in addition to the respondeat superior claim would be “both redundant and 
prejudicial.” Id. at 522. See also Brown v. Larabee, No. 04-1025-CV-W-HFS, 2005 WL 
1719908, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Jul. 25, 2005) (granting defendant motor carrier’s motion to dismiss 
claims of negligent hiring, retention, and training after the defendant admitted to imputed 
liability, if any, for the negligence of its employee). The court rejected any potential exception as 
it was clear from the case that negligence was dependent upon the employee truck driver. Id. at 
*2. See also Hoch v. John Christner Trucking, Inc., No. 05-0762-CV-W-FJG, 2005 WL 2656958, 
at *2 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 18, 2005) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s negligent 
entrustment, hiring, and training after the defendant admitted to imputed liability for the 
negligence of its employee, if any, under a respondeat superior claim). The plaintiff in Hoch 
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little discussion of the dicta in McHaffie or any possible exception to its 
general rule. This makes sense because outside of a claim for punitive 
damages, there are few fact patterns that could potentially invoke one of the 
other two potential exceptions discussed by the Supreme Court of Missouri in 
McHaffie.136 Ultimately, the most common way to make the federal district 
court consider any possible exception to the McHaffie rule is by alleging a 
claim for punitive damages along with a negligent entrustment or hiring claim 
based on the violation of federal motor carrier regulations.137 
The federal district courts in Missouri have surprisingly vacillated on the 
existence of any exception to the McHaffie rule. A trio of decisions from the 
United States District Court for the Eastern and Western Districts of Missouri 
categorically decided that no punitive damages exception exists.138 The 
primary reason given for rejecting the exception was due to the lack of clarity 
from the Missouri courts after McHaffie.139 Chief Judge Fernando Gaitan, Jr., 
writing for the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri 
in Connelly v. H.O. Wolding Inc., was unmoved by the dicta in McHaffie and 
reasoned that “it is clear that the [punitive damages exception] language was 
not a part of the Court’s holding in McHaffie.”140 The court in Connelly thus 
rejected adopting the punitive damages exception as “Missouri has yet to 
recognize such an exception.”141 
 
attempted to argue that the causes of action were inconsistent and that it had the right to elect a 
remedy prior to the case being submitted to the jury. Id. The court rejected this argument noting 
that the claims were actually consistent and once vicarious liability is admitted, the additional 
actions “serve no real purpose.” Id. (quoting McHaffie ex rel. McHaffie v. Bunch (McHaffie II), 
891 S.W.2d, 822, 826 (Mo. 1995)). 
 136. There is at least one case where the court considered an allegation concerning the 
negligent maintenance of the tractor-trailer against the defendant motor carrier company to be a 
potential exception to the McHaffie rule. See King v. Taylor Express, Inc., No. 4:13cv1217 TCM, 
2013 WL 5567721, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 9, 2013) (reasoning that the negligence of the employer 
would not be dependent on the negligence of the employee). 
 137. Most plaintiffs, as a matter of course, will allege punitive damages from the outset of 
litigation. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of various regulations motor carriers could evade 
that would potentially serve as allegations sufficient to claim punitive damages. 
 138. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hasty, No. 10-00209-CV-W-DW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144965, at 
*7–8 (W.D. Mo. Sep. 14, 2010) (granting motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of negligent 
entrustment after rejecting the punitive damages exception); Jackson v. Myhre, No. 1:06CV188 
CDP, 2007 WL 2302527, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 7, 2007) (rejecting the punitive damages 
exception to McHaffie and Judge Catherine Perry commentating “I cannot find any more recent 
Missouri decision that recognizes any such an exception.”); Connelly v. H.O. Wolding, Inc., No. 
06-5129-CV-SW-FJG, 2007 WL 679885, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 1, 2007) (granting a defendant’s 
motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims of negligent entrustment, negligent hiring, and negligent 
training after rejecting the punitive damages exception). 
 139. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 140. Connelly, 2007 WL 679885, at *2. 
 141. Id. 
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Judge Dean Whipple, also writing for the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Missouri in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hasty, pointed to the 
lack of any formal adoption of the punitive damages exception and held “the 
Missouri Supreme Court did not create any exceptions to the rule, and in fact, 
it explicitly declined to create these exceptions.”142 Judge Whipple’s 
characterization of the decision as “explicit” is arguably misleading as the 
court in McHaffie went out of its way to suggest exceptions when it felt that 
the facts were not before the court.143 An explicit approach would have been to 
deny any exception or simply not discuss an exception altogether. 
Interestingly, the court in Connelly permitted the claim for punitive 
damages but did not allow its attachment to other forms of imputed liability 
like negligent hiring or entrustment.144 The plaintiff was only permitted to 
claim punitive damages as attached to the respondeat superior negligence 
claim.145 This decision is counterintuitive as the most likely way punitive 
damages can be pled is by proof of bad business practices of the employer—
evidence that is inadmissible without an independent claim of imputed liability 
against the employer. Also, the court in McHaffie was clear in stating that 
punitive damages would only be assessed to the employer in the form of a 
negligent entrustment or hiring claim, not to the employee and employer 
collectively.146 
The fumbling of the exception in Connelly reveals another problem with 
regards to which cause of action the punitive damages claim attaches. One year 
after Connelly, the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Missouri made a similar mistake in Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline, Inc. v. 
Collins & Hermann, Inc. by dismissing all additional claims of imputed 
liability but permitting the plaintiff to add a claim for punitive damages.147 
Curiously, the court in Southern Star seemingly accepted the punitive damages 
exception and held the plaintiff may later be able to claim punitive damages 
against the employer that would not be assessed against the employee.148 
 
 142. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144965, at *8. 
 143. McHaffie ex rel. McHaffie v. Bunch (McHaffie II), 891 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Mo. 1995) 
(the court introduced three potential exceptions to the general rule and noted those “issues await 
another day.”) 
 144. Connelly, 2007 WL 679885, at *2–3. 
 145. See id. at *2 (concluding that plaintiff was foreclosed from conducting discovery to 
prove additional theories of imputed liability). 
 146. See McHaffie II, 891 S.W.2d at 826 (reasoning that it is possible for an employer to be 
held liable for punitive damages on a theory of negligence that does not derive from and is not 
dependent on the negligence of the employee). 
 147. S. Star Cent. Gas Pipeline, Inc. v. Collins & Hermann, Inc., No. 08-5048-CV-SW-WAK, 
2008 WL 5423339, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 29, 2008). 
 148. Id. at *2. The court also noted that there may be another claim against the defendant that 
would not be “derived from, or dependent upon, the negligence of [its employee].” Id. 
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Despite this conclusion, the court still dismissed all additional claims of 
imputed liability against the employer—making all evidence sufficient for 
punitive damages against the employer inadmissible.149 
The previous three cases proved to be the minority, and the majority of 
federal district courts currently recognize a punitive damages exception to the 
McHaffie rule.150 Despite this consensus, not all federal district courts agree on 
its application.151 Nevertheless, the federal district courts interpreting Missouri 
law generally view the discussion of a punitive damages exception in McHaffie 
as a strong indicator that the Supreme Court of Missouri would have adopted 
the exception if the facts were present.152 The McHaffie dicta thus leads most 
courts to the conclusion that the Missouri Supreme Court wanted to allow 
plaintiffs, with sufficient evidence, to hold employers accountable for willful 
and wanton behavior.153 Under such circumstances, the jury can consider the 
conduct of the employer, “beyond the actions of the negligent employee and 
increase the exemplary award based on such conduct.”154 Some courts further 
reason that the punitive damages exception serves public policy by not 
allowing motor carriers to insulate themselves from liability for egregious 
business practices.155 
3. The Western District Attempts to Resolve the Exception 
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri 
(“Western District”) in Wilson v. Image Flooring, LLC, recently provided a 
great deal of clarity by adopting the punitive damages exception.156 The court 
reasoned that the Supreme Court of Missouri would adopt the exception if it 
were to decide the issue in the right circumstances.157 This is the only 
 
 149. Id. The court might have been indicating that additional claims of imputed liability 
would later become available if the plaintiff could discover evidence to support a claim for 
punitive damages, but this seems doubtful as the court bluntly stated “there is nothing to be 
gained by permitting plaintiff to proceed against [the defendant] on other theories of imputed 
liability.” Id. 
 150. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 151. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 152. Miller v. Crete Carrier Corp., No. 4:02-CV-797 CAS, 2003 WL 25694930, at *1, *3–4 
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 7, 2003). 
 153. Kwiatkowski v. Teton Transp., Inc., No. 11-1302-CV-W-ODS, 2012 WL 1413154, at *4 
(W.D. Mo. Apr. 23, 2012) (“If the Missouri Supreme Court was presented with the issue, the 
Court believes it would recognize a punitive-damage exception to the rule stated in McHaffie.”). 
 154. Jodlowski v. Donovan Decker & Lindsey Petroleum Transp., Inc., No. 09-05051-CV-
SW-JTM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144966, at *5 (W.D. Mo. June 8, 2010). 
 155. Kwiatkowski, 2012 WL 1413154, at *4 (citing J.J. Burns, Note, Respondeat Superior as 
an Affirmative Defense: How Employers Immunize Themselves from Direct Negligence Claims, 
109 MICH. L. REV. 657, 676 (2011)). 
 156. Wilson v. Image Flooring, LLC, 400 S.W.3d 386, 392–93 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
 157. Id. 
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significant Missouri appellate decision concerning the punitive damages 
exception, or any potential exception, in the nineteen years since the initial 
McHaffie decision. The holding of Image Flooring should be binding on all 
federal courts applying Missouri law, as it the highest Missouri court decision 
on the issue and thus is “the best evidence of Missouri law.”158 But the 
decision still may not change the ultimate outcome depending on how strictly 
the federal district court applies the pleading standard for motions to 
dismiss.159 
The Image Flooring decision presents the familiar facts of a plaintiff 
alleging both imputed liability via respondeat superior and liability based on 
negligent hiring, training, supervision, and entrustment against an employer 
who freely admitted liability for the negligence of its employee.160 The 
defendant won on the additional claims of direct negligence at summary 
judgment and the case proceeded to trial only on the negligence and respondeat 
superior claims.161 The plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that both claims could 
be submitted because sufficient facts existed to justify punitive damages.162 
Notably, the trial court did not outright deny the punitive damages exception, 
but simply held that the facts of the case would not support submitting a claim 
of punitive damages—a holding that would later be reversed.163 After winning 
at trial on the negligence claim,164 the plaintiff appealed the trial court’s 
decision to grant summary judgment to the defendant on the direct liability 
negligence claims against the employer for negligent hiring, training, 
supervision, and entrustment.165 
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District agreed with the 
plaintiff and explicitly held the punitive damages exception existed and that the 
facts supported a claim for punitive damages.166 The court began its discussion 
 
 158. Bockelman v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 403 F.3d 528, 531 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 159. Compare King v. Taylor Express, Inc., No. 4:13cv1217 TCM, 2013 WL 5567721, at *3 
(E.D. Mo. Oct. 9, 2013) (relying on Image Flooring to deny a motion to dismiss a negligent 
entrustment claim), and Harris v. Decker Truck Line, Inc., No. 4:12CV1598 DDN, 2013 WL 
1769095, at *1, *2–3, *6 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 24, 2013) (also relying on Image Flooring to deny a 
motion to dismiss claims of negligent hiring, entrustment, supervision, and training) with Braxton 
v. DKMZ Trucking, Inc., No. 4:13-cv-1335-JCH, 2013 WL 6592771, at *2–4 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 
2013) (granting a motion to dismiss additional claims of imputed negligence and not discussing 
the punitive damages exception from Image Flooring). 
 160. Wilson, 400 S.W.3d at 388. 
 161. Id. at 390–91. 
 162. Id. at 390. 
 163. Id. at 390, 399. 
 164. The jury rendered a verdict assigning 75% of the fault to the defendant employer and 
employee and 25% to the plaintiff. Id. The total amount won by the plaintiff totaled roughly 
$1.17 million. Id. 
 165. Wilson, 400 S.W.3d at 391. 
 166. Id. at 392–93. 
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by noting that no Missouri court had addressed the issue since the original 
McHaffie decision.167 With little precedent to rely on, the court found the dicta 
to be persuasive because a successful claim for punitive damages against the 
employer neutralizes the two concerns of the McHaffie decision: prejudice to 
the employer and judicial economy.168 
The court reasoned that punitive damages become a reality once an 
employer’s business practices can be characterized as showing a complete 
indifference or conscious disregard to the safety of others.169 After this 
threshold event, all evidence concerning prior bad acts is now “both relevant 
and material” and no longer a “waste [of] time” as determined by the Supreme 
Court of Missouri in McHaffie.170 More importantly, the once forbidden 
evidence is no longer prejudicial or unfair since it directly goes to prove a 
substantive claim against the employer—negligent hiring, entrustment, 
training, and supervision.171 The court did not discuss how the trial court on 
remand could ensure the evidence of past business practices would not 
prejudice the jury with regard to deciding the central issue of negligence at the 
time of the accident. But, the court probably did not have to give much 
direction since both the trial court and the defendant employer could opt to 
bifurcate the trials as to not taint the jury with prejudicial evidence concerning 
prior bad acts.172 
III.  CLARIFYING THE MCHAFFIE RULE 
A. The Need for a Punitive Damages Exception 
The McHaffie decision failed to properly carve out necessary exceptions—
namely one for punitive damages against the motor carrier. The casual 
discussion of such exceptions by the court, without more, is particularly 
frustrating as the holding left lower courts with a seemingly hard and fast rule. 
The overall decision provides a considerable safety blanket to motor carrier 
companies seeking to keep evidence of bad business practices away from 
plaintiffs. If the court dismisses all additional claims outside respondeat 
superior, all evidence concerning business practices, hiring policies, regulation 
compliance, logbooks, or prior incidents becomes inadmissible, and more 
importantly, undiscoverable. Without additional claims of imputed liability, 
any evidence concerning bad business practices would not relate “to the claim 
 
 167. Id. at 392. 
 168. Id. at 393. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Wilson, 400 S.W.3d at 393 (citing McHaffie ex rel. McHaffie v. Bunch (McHaffie II), 
891 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Mo. 1995)). 
 171. Id. 
 172. MO REV. STAT. § 510.263 (2013). 
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or defense of the party seeking discovery” and thus would not be within the 
scope of discovery.173 
The highly regulated nature of the motor carrier industry and the great 
potential for harm justifies the punitive damages exception.174 Besides having 
to carry a minimum amount of liability insurance, motor carriers have 
numerous duties including: using drivers who are qualified according to 
federal regulation,175 not encouraging or requiring drivers to violate federal 
regulations,176 procuring a twelve month history of the traffic law and 
ordinance convictions of drivers,177 investigating the safety performance of 
drivers for the preceding three years with previous employers,178 not 
scheduling runs that would require drivers to exceed the speed limit,179 and 
ensuring all drivers are physically qualified to drive and do not abuse illegal 
substances while driving.180 These are just a few of the numerous regulations 
imposed on motor carriers, any violation of which may justify invoking the 
punitive damages exception.181 
The most important regulations, both for plaintiffs and the public, are the 
limits on how many hours a driver can operate a tractor-trailer. The 
Department of Transportation (DOT) carefully regulates drivers’ operating 
hours.182 In 2013, the DOT reduced the amount of weekly operating hours 
from 82 hours a week to 70 hours a week.183 Any driver reaching this 
maximum is further required to sleep for two consecutive days before returning 
to start the next work week, and the sleep must encompass the hours from 1:00 
to 5:00 a.m.184 These seemingly draconian regulations serve the important 
 
 173. MO. SUP. CT. R. 56.01(b)(1). It would most likely be possible to inquire into the 
logbooks of the driver for the time leading up to the accident to prove fatigue at the time of the 
accident, but most motor carriers would likely try to limit the scope of discovery as much as 
possible to the incident in question. 
 174. Due to the great potential for harm, motor carriers are required to carry a significant 
amount of liability insurance. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also 49 C.F.R. § 
387.303 (2013) for some of the various requirements. 
 175. 49 C.F.R. § 391.11. 
 176. 49 C.F.R. § 390.13. 
 177. 49 C.F.R. § 391.27(a). 
 178. 49 C.F.R. §§ 391.23(a)(2), (c)(1). 
 179. 49 C.F.R. § 392.6. 
 180. 49 C.F.R. §§ 391.41(a)(12)(i), 391.43, 392.4(a). 
 181. See Rules & Regulations, FED. MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN., 
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/regulations/title49/b/5/3?section_type=C%29 (last visited Oct. 12, 
2014), for a comprehensive list of all regulations with which motor carriers must comply. 
 182. 49 C.F.R. § 395.3. 
 183. See New Hours-of-Service Safety Regulations to Reduce Truck Driver Fatigue Begin 
Today, FED. MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN., http://www.dot.gov/briefing-room/new-hours-
service-safety-regulations-reduce-truck-driver-fatigue-begin-today (July 1, 2013). 
 184. Id. 
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purpose of preventing driver fatigue in tractor-trailer operators—a major cause 
of collisions.185 
The inherent danger of tractor-trailer operation and the incentive for motor 
carriers to have drivers log as many hours as possible requires accountability 
and deterrence through punitive damages.186 Due to such danger, Missouri case 
law recognizes that proof of regulatory violations is sufficient to submit a 
claim of punitive damages to a jury.187 This is a logical policy as the 
intentional or even unintentional violation of motor carrier regulations 
generally demonstrates “willful, wanton, malicious or . . . reckless [behavior] 
as to be in utter disregard of the consequences.”188 
1. A Simple Case for the McHaffie Rule and a Punitive Damages 
Exception 
A basic hypothetical reveals the necessity of both the general McHaffie 
rule and its punitive damages exception. Posey Plaintiff is struck by a tractor-
trailer while driving to the park. The tractor-trailer is driven by Calvin 
Careless, an employee of Hasty Delivery, LLC. Suppose Hasty Delivery 
admits Calvin was acting within the scope of his employment. But, assume 
Calvin Careless, despite his moniker, was truly not at fault for the accident. 
Further, assume that Hasty Delivery failed to keep adequate logs for Calvin, 
failed to reprimand Calvin for working too many hours, implicitly encouraged 
Calvin to falsify his driving logs, and generally ignored all federal regulations 
in its business practices and supervision of Calvin. 
The initial query for the jury should be the negligence of Calvin Careless at 
the time of the accident, not the many negligent business practices of Hasty 
Delivery. And, it would be difficult for a jury to separate the past negligence 
from the issue of negligence at the pertinent time if it heard all the evidence at 
once. The feared and likely result would be the jury looking past the incident in 
question and punishing both Hasty Delivery and Calvin for prior bad acts and 
dangerous business practices.189 Because liability is only “imputed” to the 
 
 185. Fatigue is considered one of the three “major factors” for all crashes and responsible for 
thirteen percent of all tractor-trailer crashes. See The Large Truck Crash Causation Study, FED. 
MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN. (July 2007), http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/safety/research-and- 
analysis/large-truck-crash-causation-study-analysis-brief. 
 186. Trotter v. B & W Cartage Co., Inc., No. 05-cv-0205-MJR, 2006 WL 1004882, at *1, *7, 
*9 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2006) (applying Missouri law and holding the evidence suggested the 
defendant motor carrier “sen[t] a message to drivers that hours of service violations were 
acceptable conduct” and sustaining an award of punitive damages). 
 187. Harris v. Decker Truck Line, Inc., No. 4:12CV1598 DDN, 2013 WL 1769095, at *5 
(E.D. Mo. Apr. 24, 2013). 
 188. Warner v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 428 S.W.2d 596, 603 (Mo. 1968). 
 189. This is precisely why prior bad acts are inadmissible to show negligence at the pertinent 
time. 
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extent the employee was negligent, the extraneous evidence concerning Hasty 
Delivery’s business practices should not be considered—until it can be proven 
that Calvin was negligent at the time of the accident. 
Changing the hypothetical, suppose Calvin Careless lived up to his name 
and was entirely at fault for the accident due to fatigue. Further, assume he was 
fatigued because he had been driving twenty-hour days for the past week with 
minimal rest. To the extent the jury needs to decide whether Calvin was 
negligent, the initial query remains the same as before: was he negligent at the 
time of the accident? Evidence concerning the number of hours Calvin logged 
that week may be relevant to show his general fatigue at the time in question, 
but the evidence of prior business practices and violations remains forbidden 
fruit and is considered unrelated as to whether Calvin was negligent at the time 
of the collision. 
Assuming McHaffie applies and only the respondeat superior claim can be 
submitted, the jury would only hear evidence concerning negligence at the 
time in question to determine liability. Hasty Delivery would be able to keep 
the jury from hearing any damning evidence concerning its poor business 
practices and continue to overwork and under-supervise its drivers. While 
Hasty Delivery and its Calvin Careless should not be deemed to be negligent at 
the time in question merely because they were negligent in the past, Hasty 
Delivery should still not get away with breaking federal regulations if Calvin 
was indeed at fault. Without any punitive damages exception to the McHaffie 
rule, employers like Hasty Delivery or Rumble Transport insulate themselves 
from any independent liability on the basis of egregious business conduct.190 
2. Are Punitive Damages Ever Warranted? 
At least one commentator, Richard A. Mincer, has questioned whether a 
motor carrier will ever engage in conduct egregious enough to warrant punitive 
damages.191 Mincer asserts, “It is simply counterintuitive to assert that a motor 
carrier is going to willfully and wantonly send an untrained driver out on the 
road in expensive equipment if the motor carrier believes there is a high 
likelihood that the driver will be involved in an accident.”192 The hypothetical 
offered is not well tethered in reality, as no business will deliberately try to 
harm motorists. But, there certainly are motor carriers willing to break 
regulations to keep the cost of business low and motor carriers who fail to 
 
 190. Kwiatkowski v. Teton Transp., Inc., No. 11-1302-CV-W-ODS, 2012 WL 1413154, at *4 
(W.D. Mo. Apr. 23, 2012). 
 191. Richard A. Mincer, The Viability of Direct Negligence Claims Against Motor Carriers in 
the Face of an Admission of Respondeat Superior, 10 WYO. L. REV. 229, 261–62 (2010). 
 192. Id. at 261. 
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properly oversee their drivers. Such conduct goes beyond mere negligence and 
demonstrates a “conscious disregard” for the rights of other motorists.193 
Mincer seems naïve in believing that a motor carrier would never 
intentionally violate regulations to make more money or unintentionally violate 
regulations due to a complete lack of oversight. Although a lack of oversight 
may be “mere negligence” in most cases, which would not warrant punitive 
damages, such failure specific to the motor carrier industry should be sufficient 
to warrant punitive damages. The federal government painstakingly imposes 
hundreds of regulations on motor carriers just to do business, and most of the 
regulations require strict oversight of drivers because of the great danger posed 
to motorists. 
Mincer also argues that because motor carriers are so highly regulated, the 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration will disqualify any unqualified 
driver, and thus no motor carrier could possibly operate in a manner to warrant 
punitive damages.194 Again, Mincer’s position is naïve. The Federal Motor 
Carrier Safety Administration is not an omnipresent entity, and unqualified, 
tired, and dangerous drivers will eventually get behind the wheel of massive 
tractor-trailers. The most obvious example comes from McHaffie, where 
Donald Farmer was unqualified to drive his vehicle.195 
A more tragic example occurred in Garrett v. Albright, where the plaintiffs 
offered evidence that the driver of a tractor-trailer drove well beyond the 
mandated hours and violated logbook-recording rules on a frequent basis and 
that his employer “failed to act on or even observe those violations.”196 Even 
though this driver should have been disqualified for a number of other 
reasons,197 he still managed to get behind the wheel of a tractor-trailer and kill 
four people in a tragic accident.198 Not surprisingly, eyewitness testimony 
stated the driver appeared “inattentive” and “like he was falling asleep” right 
before the accident.199 The court correctly held that such failure to observe 
industry standards and corporate policies were sufficient to submit a claim for 
punitive damages, as those rules have “the clear purpose of preventing injury 
to the motoring public from unsafe drivers.”200 
 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 262. 
 195. McHaffie ex rel. McHaffie (McHaffie II) v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822, 828 (Mo. 1995) (en 
banc). 
 196. Garrett v. Albright, Nos. 06-CV-4137-NKL, 06-CV-0785, 06-CV-4139, 06-CV-4209, 
06-CV-4237, 2008 WL 795613, at *1–3, *6 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 21, 2008). 
 197. The driver had a medical history of heart attack and stroke and was considered a “red 
flag” health risk. Id. at *2. 
 198. Id. at *1. 
 199. Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 200. Id. at *6. 
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The role of punitive damages in this context will also properly encourage 
high compliance from motor carriers and deter bad business practices that put 
motorists at risk of injury or death. If motor carriers know that evidence of 
negligent hiring, supervision, or entrustment may be presented to a jury, there 
will be considerable deterrence of regulatory violations or “missteps”201 by 
motor carrier companies. Such a result creates a strong incentive for 
compliance and safety—the entire point of punitive damages. 
B. The McHaffie Rule Should Not Bar Punitive Damages Claims at the 
Pleading Stage 
Assuming the Supreme Court of Missouri officially recognizes the punitive 
damages exception, plaintiffs could still likely not provide sufficient facts to 
submit a claim for punitive damages at the pleading stage. Most attorneys will 
have little more than the police report to draft a petition. Without an allowance 
for discovery, it will be near impossible to state specific allegations to claim 
punitive damages in the face of a motion to dismiss. If the court were inclined 
to decide the question at the outset of the lawsuit, the plaintiff will almost 
always lose.202 This creates a problem for the rest of the lawsuit, as any 
evidence going to the business practices of the motor carrier is 
undiscoverable.203 Once dismissed, the only real hope for a plaintiff to claim 
punitive damages will be evidence provided by a whistleblower.204 
An early dismissal of independent liability claims against the motor carrier 
continues to overprotect defendants by shielding business records, hiring 
practices, and prior incidents. The end result of early dismissals gives the worst 
motor carriers the most incentive to seek dismissal of all additional negligence 
claims to hide any evidence of non-compliance. Motor carriers who do comply 
with the rules really have nothing to fear from additional claims of liability, as 
punitive damages are extremely rare and will only be proven by the most 
egregious business practices. 
The alternative and better application of the McHaffie rule is to evaluate 
the exception at the end of discovery when the trial court can adequately assess 
whether a claim for punitive damages exists. This application only punishes 
the worst actors and would not subject those motor carriers who comply with 
 
 201. Mincer, supra note 191, at 262. Mincer asserts that the dominant source of violations 
from smaller motor companies will be “missteps” and only amount to “negligence at most.” Id. 
 202. See Braxton v. DKMZ Trucking, Inc., No. 4:13-cv-1335-JCH, 2013 WL 6592771, at *2–
4 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 2013) (dismissing additional claims of imputed negligence against motor 
carrier after applying Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly “plausible” standard and finding the plaintiff 
did not even attempt “a formulaic recitation of the elements” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 203. See MO. SUP. CT. R. 56.01(b)(1). 
 204. Wright v. Watkins & Shepard Trucking, Inc., F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1094, 1096 (D. Nev. 
2013) (the court reopened discovery in response to “an anonymous letter Plaintiffs had received 
regarding Watkins & Shepard’s hiring practices.”). 
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federal regulations. It also allows the plaintiff to control his or her own lawsuit 
and decide which claims to submit to the jury—something the defendant 
should not be allowed to dictate. 
The late application of a punitive damages exception will also not consume 
the general McHaffie rule. Commentator Mincer also expresses concerns that a 
plaintiff will be able to present prejudicial testimony just by pleading punitive 
damages.205 However, this concern conflates pleading and discovering 
evidence regarding negligent entrustment, hiring, or supervision with 
submitting such evidence to the jury. A simple fix to the exception potentially 
swallowing the rule is to allow for a relaxed pleading standard for punitive 
damages, but cut off discovery or dismiss any such claim once it becomes 
apparent punitive damages are unobtainable. Indeed, the trial court is in the 
best position to control the extent of discovery and prevent costly “fishing 
expeditions.” Furthermore, defendant motor carriers have the choice to seek 
bifurcation of the trial into two stages: the first for negligence at the time of the 
accident and the second for punitive damages.206 Any motor carrier company 
deciding not to split the claims into two trials could only blame itself for the 
likely prejudicial effect on the jury. 
C. The Supreme Court of Missouri Needs to Resolve the Issue 
Given the soundness of the punitive damages exception and the court’s 
implicit recognition of the exception in McHaffie, it is time for the court to 
grant transfer in an appropriate case and clarify Missouri common law. 
Unfortunately, the court inexplicably declined to do so in Wilson v. Image 
Flooring, LLC, and left the meaning of McHaffie, yet again, in a state of 
uncertainty. It may be some time before similar facts come before the court 
again207—leaving doubt in the lower Missouri courts and federal courts 
applying Missouri law. The McHaffie decision needs clarification and the 
Supreme Court of Missouri should formally adopt the punitive damages 
exception and dictate its application. The Supreme Court of Missouri needs to 
guide the lower courts in crafting an application of the punitive damages 
exception that protects defendants from unfair prejudice, while allowing 
plaintiffs to deter egregious business practices by permitting discovery into 
prior bad acts by motor carriers. 
 
 205. Mincer, supra note 191, at 263. 
 206. MO. REV. STAT. § 510.263 (2013). 
 207. See infra Part II.B.1 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of appeal and 
opportunity). 
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CONCLUSION 
The court in McHaffie failed to give any clarity to the lower courts 
concerning the punitive damages exception. Uncertainty in the rule continues 
today, although most lower Missouri courts accept the punitive damages 
exception to the McHaffie rule. While the recent decision in Image Flooring 
moves in the right direction, the lack of an opinion by the highest Missouri 
Court leaves doubt in the law. In the meantime, plaintiffs should continue to 
seek punitive damages for negligent entrustment, supervision, and hiring 
claims based on violations of federal motor carrier regulations and press the 
trial courts into ruling on the exception. This will eventually bring the issue 
back to the attention of the Supreme Court of Missouri and at the very least 
keep motor carriers honest with regard to their business practices. 
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